CySec Foundations Teil 2
CySec Foundations Teil 2
CySec Foundations Teil 2
Set of flashcards Details
| Flashcards | 210 |
|---|---|
| Language | Deutsch |
| Category | Computer Science |
| Level | University |
| Created / Updated | 31.07.2020 / 10.08.2020 |
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Give two examples of authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) protocols.
- AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
- ChaCha20_Poly1305
In which situation whould ChaCha20 be prefered over AES?
in mobile phones -> CPUs don't have AES instruction set -> ChaCha20 is faster than AES
What is the problem with ciphertexts that haven't been secured with a MAC?
The integrity cannot be guaranteed
What is the problem with protocols that don't use the PKI for authentication?
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
During the TLS handshake, the server sends the client a signature in the ServerKeyExchange packet. How can the client decrypt that signature?
client has to use public key contained in the digital certificate of the server
What parts of a certificate are confidential and should be encrypted?
the private key with which the encryption happens
How does a data assurance package (e.g. Tripwire) provide some secondary virus detection capabilities?
they hash values for each file stored on a protectd system
-> filechange results in hashchange
-> triggers integrity alert
Which character is dangerous in context of SQL Injection attacks?
the single quote: '
Consider an adversary sniffing the network (where a Kerberos v5 auth system is implemented) and seeing the ticket that the ticket granting server (TGS) sent to client C. The adversary knows the identity of C. What prevents the adversary from using the ticket to obtain the service in place of C?
The timestamp makes certain that replay attacks do not work. The ticket itself cannot be modified since he does not know the respective key for decryption and re-encryption of any eventual new ticket.
Given g, p, b as Bobs private key and a as Alices private key, what is the formula for the shared secret?
shared secret = g ^ ( b * a ) mod p
