Concepts & Mesurement

Conceptual stretching occurs when concepts are loosened up so that they apply to additional cases. In the philosophical literature this is the contrast between extention and intension.

We must first think clearly about the substance and structure of our concepts and then we can begin to think aobut how to validly operationalize that theory into a quantitative measure. Since most complex concepts are three level, we need to ask aobut the degree t owhich the quantitative measure reflects the concept structure. In fact there are two structural questions:

1. How to combine indicators to form the secondary-level dimensions; and
2. How to combine secondary-level dimensions to get the basic-level concept.

A concept is "the basic unit of thinking. It can be said that we have a concept of A (or of A-ness) when we are able to distinguish A from whatever is not-A"

Example: Wealthy

A measure is "a unit in terms of which quantitative differences applicable to entities or properties can be compared and assigned numerical values".

Example: GDP (per capita PPP)

• Theories are logically consistent sets of concepts that form statements to explain phenomena of interest;
• Concepts are the basis of all claissifications and typologies and often have important political implications;
• Measurement is a crucual tool to describe the world; indicators often have important political implications;
• Different indicators of the same phenomena may lead to widely different conclusions.

Democratic states do not fight wars against each other.

• Concepts are not simple depictions of reality;
• Concepts posess certain internal theoretical strucutures that reflect assumptions (ontological, normative) of the theorist who uses them:
  • Soviet democracy vs. liberal democracy
  • Relevance of election vs. constraints on power
• Internal theoretical structure becomes increasingly important as...
  • ... researchers analyze the theoretical relationships linking concepts (cf. democratic peace thesis)
  • ... researchers use politically-laden everyday language.

Goertz expounds an extreme nominalist view regarding concepts. H argues that a concept involves a theoretical and empirical analysis of the object or phenomenon referred to by the word: All those who focus purely on semantic issues are liable to end up seeing definitions as arbitrary. If the concept is not intimately related to the empirical analysis of a phenomenon then there is nothing to which one can anchor the concept, and everything becomes a matter of who is in charge of the definition.

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• our experience of the world is not direct (Kant). Rather, we experience the world and reflect on this experience;
• concpts structure and mediate our experience (apprehension) and our reflections (comprehension);
• experiences are not perceived as unique but rather in terms of patterns and categories. Thinking is always thinking in categories;
• we constantly create meaning by conceptualizing what happens around us. We constantly categorize and measure;
• concepts are language-bound and often normatively loaded (and we are not always in a good position to detect this).
  • the false promise of objectivity: We are easily fooled by categories and indicators (Porter 1996);
  • categorization and measurement often have direct implications and are therefore often politically contested;
  • in the social sciences, all measurement/concepts is contested.

An empirical concept consists of:

1. A term (linlguistic label);
2. Attributes that define those phenomena (intension, connotation);
3. Indicators to help locate the concept in the empirical space (measurement, operationalization);
4. Phenomena to be defined (referents, extension, denotation)

-> positivist-empiricist definition.

"Concepts are our basic units of (linguistic) action. In this perspective, concepts are not interior images that correspond to external realitites, but practical tools that allow us to do many things. [...] We need our concepts to perform referential roles. We need them to grasp concrete realities in abstract terms. [...] If concepts are means of action, their meaning does not derive from their correspondence to objective realities, but from their practical roles in linguistic communication"

-> linguistic turn in philosophy.

Goertz proposes a causal, ontological, and realist view of concepts.

Causal: concepts play central roles in theories

• Theories are logically consistent sets of concepts that form statements to explain phenomena of interest;
• Concdpts possess certain internal theoretical structures that reflect assumptions (ontological, normative) of the tehorist who uses them;
• "if concepts are means of action, their meaning does not derive from their correspondence to objective realities, but from their practical roles in linguistic communication" (Schedler 2010);
• "ontological attributes [of concepts] play role in causal hypotheses" (Goertz 2006:5) -> concepts have to be seen in the context of the theories that inform them and that they are part of.

His view of concepts is causal because it identifies ontological attributes that play a key role in causal hypotheses, explanations, and mechanisms.

Realist: Exclusive focus on semantics (à la Sartori) may lead to

• ... either conceptual ambiguity (e.g. Babbie 2001)
• ... or naturalism (reification, essentialism, linguistic instrumentalism) (e.g Sartori 1984) -> see meeting no. 4

His view on concepts is realist because it involves an empirical analysis of the phenomenon.

Ontological: "Concepts are theories about ontology: they are theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon" (Goertz 2006: 5)

Causal vs. non-causal (ontological) view:

• causal: concept and indicator are causally related (direction of causality?)
  • concept -> Indicator
• Ontological: Basic-level concept is constituted by y series of dimensions at the secondary-level
  • concept (Basic-level) - concept (secondary level) - indicator
  • Multidimensional and multi-level
• examples: a robber, a disease, democracy
  • advantages and disadvantages (court case versus election predictions)

there are 3 main points of critique:

1. reification (Verdinglichung)
2. essentialism
3. linguistic instrumentalism

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How would a "thing" have to look like, so we would not know wheter to categorize it as A or not?

The rules for climbing and descending along a ladder of abstraction are very simple - in principle. We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening its properties or attributes. Conversely, a concept is specified by the addition (or unfolding) of qualifications, i.e. by augmenting its attributs of properties:

High-level categories: Cross-area comparisons among heterogeneous contexts (Furniture)

• Maximal extension
• Minimal intension
• Definition by negation

Medium-level categories (basic-level categories): intra-area comparison among relatively homogeneous contexts (Table)

• Balance of denotation with connotation
• Definition by analysis (per genus and differentiation)

Low-level categories: case by case analysis (idiosyncratic research) (Bedside Table)

• Maximal intension
• Minimal extension
• Contextual definition

A concept is defined by necessary attributes (all attributes are necessary, otherwise the phenomenon at hand is not an example of the concept.

→ Sartori thinks in terms of classic logic (set theory)

By logical implication: There has to be an inverse relationship between intension and extension.

If attribute "small" is missing, it is no longer a bedsidetable, but still a table. If attribute "flat surface" is missing, it is no longer a table.

Typologies may be defined as "organized systems of types" (Collier et al. 2012:217).

Conceptual, descriptive and explanatory typologies:

• Forming, clarifying and refining concepts, in particular their meaning;
• Establishing an informative and productive connection between these meanings and terms used to designate them;
• Situating concepts within their semantic field (the constellation of related concepts and terms), including the identification and refinement of hierarchichal relations among concepts (involving "kind hierarchies");
• Drawing out underlying dimensions (multidimensional property spaces);
• Creating categories for classification and measurement;
• Sorting (and selecting) cases;
• Explain empirical phenomena (by displaying some form of association).

→ allow strong statements.

Typologies are based on discrete categories (hence, the link to concepts).

Reduce Complexity (which can be done more or less efficiently).

E.g. Falkner et al. (2005) on compliance with EU legislation: The world of law observance, the world of domestic politics, and the world of transposition neglect.

BUT: Multidimensionality of concepts means that things become very complex very soon. As a consequence, key dimensions need to be selected (depend on what you look at). However, the more dimensions you add, the less useful the concept becomes.

They have to be exclusive and collectively exhaustive:

Exhaustive: Can you fit all cases that you are looking at into a cell? Typology includes all theoretically relevant dimensions and all existing cases can be assigned to one of the types.

Exclusive: Does every case just go in one cell? Empirical cases can be assigned to one type only.

Exceptions: Sometims a cas just does not fit. Depending on your question and probably the amount of cases that do not fit you might adapt the typologies or you might just ignore them. However, these cases are of particular interest because they might enlighten weaknesses of the model: Probably a dimension is missing, Idiosyncratic issues, etc.?