Microeconomics I

Fiches de réveisions

Fiches de réveisions


Set of flashcards Details

Flashcards 336
Language English
Category Macro-Economics
Level University
Created / Updated 28.05.2019 / 02.03.2025
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Monopolistic Competition: Assumptions

Large number of firms selling differentiated products

Free entry and exit

Large number of firms selling differentiated products
 

Each firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product
Firms compete for customers in terms of both price and the kind of
products they sell

Monopolistic competition: diagram

Oligopoly: Assumptions

Small number of sellers with relatively high market shares

Price-making sellers

Sellers behave strategically (i.e. firms recognise their interdependence)

Many small, price-taking buyers

Oligopoly: strategies

Cournot Competition: Main Assumptions

Simultaneous quantity setting
Few firms producing homogeneous or differentiated products (typically, we will look at two firms producing identical products)
After the output decisions, price adjusts according to the demand function (in case of homogeneous products, p = p(q) where
q = q1 + q2)
Game between the firms where each firm maximises its profits given the output of the other firms

Cournot competition: Output decision

Since the profit maximization equation, derive and get the output decision with MR = MC, then write the best reponse function

Cournot equilibrium

Cournot Competition: Example - Reaction Functions Derivation

Cournot Competition: Example - Equilibrium Determination

Many Firms in Cournot Equilibrium

Bertrand Competition: Main Assumptions

Simultaneous price setting
Few (two or more) firms producing identical products
Firms have same constant average and marginal cost
No capacity constraints
! We are looking for a Bertrand equilibrium of this game, i.e. a pair of prices (p1;p2) such that each firm is maximising its profit given the price of the other firm

Bertrand Competition: Equilibrium

Prices or quantities (Cournot VS Bertrand)

Stackelberg Competition: Main Assumptions

Sequential quantity setting
Two firms producing identical product
Assume firm 1 chooses its quantity first. Firm 2 observes q1 and then chooses q2.
! Backward solution: Solve firm 2’s problem first as firm 1 (the leader) needs to anticipate the follower’s reactions.

Stackelberg Competition: Example
Consider an industry which is characterised as follows:
Two firms producing an identical good
(Inverse) demand is given by: p(y) = a - by = a - b(y1 + y2)
Each firm has a zero marginal cost
Firm 1 has a first-mover advantage
Find the Stackelberg equilibrium (y1;y2) for this industry.

Solve the follower’s problem to obtain the reaction function.
2 Solve the leader’s problem.

The follower's problem

The leader's problem

The Stackelberg equilibrium

Leader’s profit-maximizing output, Follower's profit-maximizing output, Individuals output, Industry output

Collusion

Oligopoly: Comparing the outcomes

Monopoly / Collusion VS Cournot VS Stackelberg

Differents payoffs

In exchange, we relax some assumptions

Identical consumers
Exogenous prices

general equilibrium analysis

Prices of other goods may/will affect people’s demands and supplies for a particular good (e.g. substitutes, complements ...)

Feasible allocation

xA1 + xB1 < wA1 + wB1 and xA2 + xB2 < wA2 + wB2

Edgeworth-Bowley Box: Endowment

All points in the box, including the boundary, represent

feasible allocations of the combined endowment

Edgeworth-Bowley Box: Trade

Pareto-improving allocation

An allocation of the endowment that improves the welfare of a consumer without reducing the welfare of another

Pareto improvement and trade

A Pareto efficient allocation is such that

there is no way to make all the people involved better off

there is no way to make some individual better off without making someone else worse off

all the gains from trade have been exhausted

there are no mutually advantageous trades to be made

Pareto Efficiency

Edgeworth-Bowley Box: Pareto Efficiency

Contract curve (Pareto set)

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Trade and Pareto Efficiency: The Core

Economic Problem
Given initial endowments, what is the allocation that ensures that

consumers maximise their utility
demand equals supply in all markets

Edgeworth Box: Disequilibrium

Edgeworth Box: adjustment to equilibrium