English Linguistics
Sociolinguistic and cognitive-linguistic approaches to humour
Sociolinguistic and cognitive-linguistic approaches to humour
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Lernkarten
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Words in the mind? Priming experiments
- Design:
•Extension of the lexical decision task.
•Target word to be judged is preceded by a prime
•Measures to what extent the prime influences the reaction time in the presence or absence of a prime.
- Stimulus variables: different words (eagle) & primes (bird)
- Dependent variables: response latency (= response time)
response accuracy (= correctness)
- Results: Priming effect shows degree of association between words in the mental lexicon.
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Event-related potentials (see O’Grady et al. 1997: 396-398)
- Design:
•Subject sits in front of a screen and has to read a text.
•ERP experiments measure electrical activity of the brain.
•Electrodes are place on the subject‘s scalp.
•Recordings are made of voltage fluctuations.
- Stimulus variables: different sentences
- Dependent variables: electrical activity (frequencies triggered by stimulus event) = event- related potentials
- Results: semantic surprise is associated with an N400 effect (negative spike 400 milliseconds after stimulus presentation).
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Graded informativeness and marked informativeness
- Research focus: The grammar of surprise in jokes
The present study of the mechanism of humor concentrates on the notion of surprise in semantic jokes, it explicates the ‘grammar’ of the joke and attempts to differentiate it from both the standard informative text on the one hand, and the ‘witty’ texts on the other. Both the ‘grammar’ of standard informative texts and the ‘grammar’ of the joke derive from principles regulating concept formation.
(Giora 1991: 465)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Giora’s view of information processing: Giora’s first assumption
“[T]he principles of text organization should be viewed along the lines of concept formation.” (Giora 1991: 466)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Concept formation
Concept formation, process by which a person learns to sort specific experiences into general rules or classes. With regard to action, a person picks up a particular stone or drives a specific car. With regard to thought, however, a person appears to deal with classes. For instance, one knows that stones (in general) sink and automobiles (as a class) are powered by engines. In other words, these things are considered in a general sense beyond any particular stone or automobile. Awareness of such classes can help guide behaviour in new situations. Thus two people in a bakery may never have met before, but, if one can be classified as customer and the other as clerk, they tend to behave appropriately. Similarly, many people are able to drive almost any automobile by knowing how to drive a specific automobile.
The term concept formation describes how a person learns to form classes, […]. A concept is a rule that may be applied to decide if a particular object falls into a certain class.
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Salient (unmarked) and non-salient (marked) frogs
In terms of markedness, the least informative, i.e., prototypical, members are the unmarked members of a given set – they best represent the set and are most accessible. The most informative i.e., least accessible, least typical or rather most marginal and most surprising members are considered marked in that category.
(Giora 1991: 469, italics in original)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Giora’s view of information processing
“[T]he principles of text organization should be viewed along the lines of concept formation.” (Giora 1991: 466)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Text comprehension and graded informativeness
“[A] message is informative relative to the number of uncertainties it either reduces of eliminates relative to a question.”
(Giora 1991: 467)
In textual terms, standard expository texts are considered informative, but not markedly informative as they evolve gradually from the least to the most informative message.
(Giora 1991: 469, italics in the original)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
A text is well-formed if:
a)it begins with the least informative message in the given text or text-segment. This least informative message, termed Discourse Topic (DT), is a generalization that governs the rest of the messages in the text. Cognitively, it functions as the prototypical category member which represents the redundancy structure of the set […].
b)it proceeds gradually along the informative axis whereby each message is more informative than the one it follows (the ‘Graded Informativeness Requirement’ […]. Given this Graded Informativeness Requirement, the text must end with the most informative message in the text.
(Giora 1991: 467)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Jokes as texts with marked informativeness
Jokes are markedly informative!
= SURPRISE EFFECT
Jokes […] are markedly informative. The final informative messages are marked in that they are too distant, in terms of number of similar features, from the messages preceding them. (Giora 1991: 469)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
2 conditions for joke texts
a)violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement [...] in that it ends in a markedly informative message (the Marked Informativeness Requirement)
b)causes the reader to perform a linear shift: the reader is made to cancel the first unmarked interpretation upon processing the second marked interpretation.
(Giora 1991: 470)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Giora’s psycholinguistic theory of humour
THEORY OF MENTAL PROCESSING OF HUMOUR:
HYPOTHESIS
1. violation of Graded Informativeness = Marked Informativeness
2. Unmarked information has to be cancelled
= experience and effect of semantic surprise
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Testing the SSTH
THEORY OF HUMOUR COMPETENCE:
=> HYPOTHESIS
Condition 1: text is recognised as being compatible with two (partially overlapping) scripts
Condition 2: the scripts are opposite
= ability to recognise a script-switch in a text
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
What is the difference between the two theories?
My view suggests that a humorous “surprise” does not hinge on a stark difference between two interpretations. Rather, it depends on the likelihood of the less accessible/salient interpretation [the marked inter-pretation] to be relevant to and included within the category proposed initially. A humorous surprise then does not constitute an entirely unthinkable option (Giora 1991), but only a less salient one – one that should not have but which nevertheless has escaped our attention because of our salience-prone mind [our mind that always looks for unmarked information].
(Giora 2003: 168)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Testing the marked informativeness hypothesis
- Giora’s psycholinguistic theory of humour
THEORY OF MENTAL PROCESSING OF HUMOUR:
HYPOTHESIS
1. violation of Graded Informativeness = Marked Informativeness
2. unmarked information has to be cancelled
= experience and effect of semantic surprise
PART 2: TESTING
2. unmarked information has to be cancelled =
SUPPRESSION HYPOTHESIS
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Experiment 1: Lexical decision task with contrived jokes (see Giora 2003: 170)
- Design:
•Participants read texts on computer screen.
•Immediately after each line they had to decide whether a given probe was an English word or not.
- Results:
•At the end of the first line the unmarked (salient) meaning is highly activated.
•This is still the case after the second line.
•At the punchline the unmarked meaning is no more activated than the unrelated probe => This indicates suppression of the unmarked meaning and high activation of the marked (non-salient) meaning.
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Experiment 2: Cloze test (type of lexical decision task) (see Giora 2003: 172)
- Design:
•Cloze probability = probability for a next word to follow
•In general:
change his + clothes = 42%, change his + mind = 6%, change + jacket = 3%
•Default prediction:
change his clothes should be activated the fastest; change mind, change jacket should take the same processing time.
- Result:
•It takes people considerably longer to read the joke ending than the nonjoke ending => nonjoke ending is more expected, BUT has to be suppressed to activate the joke ending = SUPPRESSION takes processing time!
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Experiment 3: ERP study (see Giora 2003: 173)
- Design:
•Semantic surprise triggers a N400 brain wave amplitude.
•Default prediction:
ok: N400 effect should be most prominent for words with a low cloze probability, e.g. semantic anomalies; highly unmarked meanings should not trigger such an effect.
ok: Joke comprehension should trigger N400 effects.
ok: The effect should be the greatest for jokes which involved highly unmarked meanings at the beginning => Unmarked meanings are more difficult to suppress!
ok: The effect should be most pronounced with good comprehenders => They have to suppress the unmarked meaning.
- Results:
•Jokes elicit larger N400 effect than nonjokes.
•This effect is most pronounced when highly unmarked meanings are involved.
•Effect is most pronounced with good joke comprehenders => They managed to suppress the incompatible, unmarked meaning
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Jokes and our “one-track” mind
Most jokes make up a discourse that best exposes our tendency to opt for the salient [unmarked] interpretation first. They exploit the fact that we wear mental blinkers, which, in the absence of apparent evidence to the contrary, keep us attending to the most salient interpretation initially. […]. Jokes indeed tend to involve some salience [markedness] imbalance that invites the comprehender to process the more salient but eventually incompatible meaning first […] in order to dispense with it and activate a less salient [marked] but congruent meaning.
To lead our “one-track mind” down “the garden path”, the initial context of a joke is usually unambiguous, compatible with the salient meaning, so that this interpretation is retained up until the punch line, at which point a sudden incongruity forces reinterpretation. (Giora 2003: 168)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Optimal innovation
A joke triggers:
a.a novel response, but
b.such that would also allow for the recovery of a salient [unmarked] meaning from which the novel meaning stems, in order that the similarity and difference between them may be assessable (the optimal innovation hypothesis).
(Giora 2003: 176)
LECTURE 6
Giora’s marked informativeness and optimal innovation hypotheses
Salient (unmarked) and non-salient (marked) frogs
IDEALLY,
- the two images are maximally distinct, BUT
- only so distinct that you can still see the FROGNESS in the marked image!
- This allows you to compare them and dwell on the differences as well as the innovation = the new things you are learning.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
2 conditions for joke texts
a)violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement [...] in that it ends in a markedly informative message (the Marked Informativeness Requirement)
b)causes the reader to perform a linear shift: the reader is made to cancel the first unmarked interpretation upon processing the second marked interpretation.
(Giora 1991: 470)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Jokes and our “one-track” mind
Most jokes make up a discourse that best exposes our tendency to opt for the salient [unmarked] interpretation first. They exploit the fact that we wear mental blinkers, which, in the absence of apparent evidence to the contrary, keep us attending to the most salient interpretation initially. […]. Jokes indeed tend to involve some salience [markedness] imbalance that invites the comprehender to process the more salient but eventually incompatible meaning first […] in order to dispense with it and activate a less salient [marked] but congruent meaning.
To lead our “one-track mind” down “the garden path”, the initial context of a joke is usually unambiguous, compatible with the salient meaning, so that this interpretation is retained up until the punch line, at which point a sudden incongruity forces reinterpretation. (Giora 2003: 168)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Optimal innovation (Giora 2003)
A joke triggers:
a.a novel response, but
b.such that would also allow for the recovery of a salient [unmarked] meaning from which the novel meaning stems, in order that the similarity and difference between them may be assessable (the optimal innovation hypothesis).
(Giora 2003: 176)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Salient (unmarked) and non-salient (marked) frogs
IDEALLY,
the two images are maximally distinct, BUT
only so distinct that you can still see the FROGNESS in the marked image!
This allows you to compare them and dwell on the differences as well as the innovation = the new things you are learning.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Cocnitive Linguistics: Tenets of the structuralist and componential view of semantics
- Dictionary view of meaning
-> linguistic meaning is conventional and separate from concrete and immediate experience and world knowledge
- Semantics vs. pragmatics
-> only semantic meaning forms part of the lexicon
-> pragmatics is part of parole not langue
- Compositionality
-> word meaning can be decomposed into semantic “primitives” = semantic features
-> sentence meaning = word meaning + grammar
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
The embodiment of meaning
Embodiment of meaning:
Meaning is the result of:
•a cognizer’s purposeful (= goal-driven) orientation that emerges through
•his/her sensorimotor interaction within her physical, social and communicative world of experience.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Meaning and the cognitive “backstage”
Language, as we use it, is but the tip of the iceberg of cognitive construction. As discourse unfolds, much is going on behind the scenes: New domains appear, links are forged, abstract meanings operate, internal structure emerges and spreads, viewpoint and focus keep shifting. Everyday talk and commonsense reasoning are supported by invisible, highly abstract, mental creations, which […] [language] […] helps to guide, but does not by itself define. (Fauconnier 1994: xxii-xxiii)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Mental space theory and conceptual blending: Core assumptions of MST & BT
1.Meaning is not static but dynamic.
2.Linguistic meaning is strongly influenced by the linguistic and extra-linguistic context.
3.Words do not contain meaning; words and other linguistic structures are cues to trigger processes of meaning construction in context.
4. (Linguistic) meaning is only fully developed in actual discourse. It resides in the conceptual representations or mental spaces and the connections between them that are mentally constructed when speaking and hearing.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Meaning construction as a mental process
A linguistic expression E does not have a meaning in itself; rather it has a meaning potential, and it is only within a complete discourse and in context that meaning will actually be produced. The unfolding of discourse brings into play complex cognitive constructions. They include the setting up of internally structured domains linked to each other by connectors; this is effected on the basis of linguistic, contextual, and situational clues.
(Fauconnier 1997: 37)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Mental spaces
Mental spaces are:
1.Small and abstract conceptual packages that are established as we think and talk – they are unique and temporary domains
3. Are mental contexts of time, belief, situation, etc.
4. Cognitive worlds relative to which we become able
to track reference.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Linguistic units as Space Builders
Space builders:
1.Are triggers for setting up mental contexts (= mental spaces) beyond the ‘here and now’
2. Include adverbials of…
location: in the film, at the party
time: last year
adverbs: probably, possibly, really
connectives: if ... then, either…or
certain verbs: believe, think, hope, imagine…
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Spaces involved in Blending (see Fauconnier 1997: 149)
- Blending uses at least four spaces:
- Two inputs - sources of emerging meaning
- One generic space - schematic information; basis for establishing mappings between inputs
- One blend - contains emergent meaning derived from the network connections
- These elements are linked by mappings
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Blending processes (Fauconnier and Turner 2002)
•Connections between the input spaces are established by matching
•Only matched information is projected onto the blend. There are 3 processes that give rise to emergent structure:
1. Composition:
Opening the different mental spaces.
Division of information in inputs. They are linked by mappings (on the basis of the generic space).
2.Completion:
Recruitment of background frames, to complete the information in the inputs (SURGERY, BUTCHERY).
3.Elaboration:
“[...] is the on-line processing that produces the structure unique to the blend.” (Evans & Green 2006: 410)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Compression, decompression and backward projection
•Conceptual blending is driven by processes of compression. Information from the input spaces is compressed in the blend.
•The conceptual blend can also be disintegrated or unpacked (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 119-122).
•Decompression is the process where blended elements in the blend are separated again for backward projection into the input spaces.
•Backward projection is a powerful tool to highlight the dissimilarities between the blended concept and the input models: “Indeed, while similarities can be exploited to create a blend, the same blend can be ‘unpacked’ to reveal dissimilarities” (Evans and Green 2006: 426).
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Blended conceptualizations
- The theory of conceptual blending was devised by Fauconnier and Turner (1996, 1998, 2002).
- It accounts for the creation of meaning that emerges creatively in a specific situation.
- Blending is a general cognitive process that plays an important role in thought and imagination.
- Blending theory is conceived as a general theory of (linguistic) creativity.
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Conceptual blending and humour comprehension: Salience (Giora 2003)
Most jokes make up a discourse that best exposes our tendency to opt for the salient interpretation first. They exploit the fact that we wear mental blinkers, which, in the absence of apparent evidence to the contrary, keep us attending to the most salient interpretation initially. […]. Jokes indeed tend to involve some salience imbalance that invites the comprehender to process the more salient but eventually incompatible meaning first […] in order to dispense with it and activate a less salient but congruent meaning.
To lead our “one-track mind” down “the garden path, “the initial context of a joke is usually unambiguous, compatible with the salient meaning, so that this interpretation is retained up until the punch line, at which point a sudden incongruity forces reinterpretation. (Giora 2003: 168)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Advantages and problems of blending theory (see also Coulson and Oakley 2000; Coulson 2005)
•Blending theory allows to model the situated construction of creative meaning, including humour.
•It is impossible to analyse forms of humorous meaning construction beyond the dynamics of jokes.
•The creativity is primarily modelled post-hoc, after the fact.
•The actual psycholinguistic dynamics of blending in humour has not been sufficiently tested by psycholinguistic experiments yet (see Attardo 2017).
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Criticism against the SSTH and the GTVH from the perspective of cognitive linguistics
[A] fundamental criticism from the perspective of cognitive linguistics would be that the SSTH and GTVH overemphasize the unique character of humor in comparison to normal language and cognition.
(Brône and Feyaerts 2004: 370)
LECTURE 7
Conceptual blending and other cognitive-linguistic construal operations involved in incongruity resolution
Conceptual metonymy = shift of reference point
Difference between metaphor and metonymy:
-metaphor: relation between different domains
-metonymy: relation between concepts within the same domain (part-whole relations)
The ham sandwich just spilled beer over himself.
Washington is insensitive to the needs of ordinary people.